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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
RICHARD LYNN CARLSON

Plaintiff and Appellee,

vs.
Docket No. 950108-CA
RICHARD LYNN CARLSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1994) of Defendants appeal from his final
judgment of conviction of assault by a prisoner, a third degree
felony under Utah Code Ann

§ 76-5-102.5 (1994).

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Pertinent statutory provisions and rules included in the
addendum are:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1994).
Utah Rule of Evidence 609.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Issue;

Whether the prosecutor's improper interrogation and

arguments to the jury were so improper that there was a
reasonable likelihood that, absent the improper comments,
the result would have been different.
Standard of Review;

On review, this court will determine

whether the prosecution's conduct constituted error as a
1

matter of law by calling to the jurors' attention matters
they were not justified in considering in reaching a
verdict.

This court will reverse if the misconduct is

determined to be harmful so that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more
favorable result for the defendant.

State v. Tillman, 750

P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987); State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339,
342 (Ut. App. 1993).
Issue;

Whether the prosecution's misconduct was

sufficiently obvious and harmful to constitute "plain error"
in light of defense counsel's failure to object.
Standard of Review:

Notwithstanding defense counsel's

failure to object, reversal is appropriate if the error is
both "obvious" and "harmful". Plain and obvious error is
harmful if the likelihood of a different result is
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.
State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004 (Utah App. 1994).

"Plain

Error" is a determination of law and this court will not
defer to the trial court's failure to recognize the error
below.
Issue:

Whether defense counsel's failure to object to the

prosecution's misconduct denied defendant the effective
assistance of counsel.
Standard of Review:

This court will not defer to the lower

court when making a determination whether the defendant was
2

denied the ineffective assistance of counsel.

This issue is

subject to de novo review of the ultimate legal question.
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995).
Moreover, this issue is raised now for the first time on
appeal and has not been presented to the trial court for its
consideration.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case:

Defendant appeals his conviction of assault by a prisoner, a
third degree felony.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5.

Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below:

On November 30, 1994, a jury convicted Mr. Richard Carlson
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah,
with the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding.

(R 134, 136).

On January 9, 1995, the court sentenced Mr. Carlson to an
indeterminate term "not to exceed five years" in the Utah State
Prison, consecutive to the sentence Mr. Carlson is already
serving.

(R 137).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Timothy Smith was an inmate confined in the Salt Lake County
Jail.

On September 4, 1994, his face was partially covered by a

blanket and he was forcibly pushed by another inmate into the
bars in tier 2-E.

Smith's nose was broken and his face was cut.
3

(R 304) .

Inmate Smith had been previously housed in another area

of the jail, tier "2-C-9", but had demanded that he be moved
because his property was allegedly being stolen.

(R 278). When

Smith was moved into tier 2-E, his former cellmates, "the
Mexicans", told the inmates in 2-E that Smith was a "snitch".

(R

285, 324-28, 336); (R 324). There were at least 16 and as many
as 24 inmates in that tier.

(R 134,201, 156).

When this message circulated, a 2-E inmate named Kidder
rolled up Smith's blanket and tossed it on the floor, together
with a demand that Smith get out of 2-E.

(R 288-89).

Smith

moved towards the cell bars and called for the jailer to "Get me
out of here."

(R 287). Smith was surrounded by several inmates.

Smith did not know the two inmates who were then closest to him,
and could not identify them, but Smith claimed that "[t]hey were
setting themselves up, you know, to jump me and everything."

(R

287-88).
Despite the fact that defendant Richard Carlson was not one
of those inmates and that Smith's head was partially covered by a
blanket, Smith claimed that Carlson also had taunted him and
participated in the incident.
corroborated Smith's claim.

(R 289-90).

No one else

In an effort to describe his

environment, Smith admitted that the lighting in the jail cell
was darker than the lighting in the courtroom, with a small,
florescent light "in the corner . . . [b]ack against the wall,
maybe six feet away, six or seven feet high."
4

(R 304-5).

Contrary to Smith's claims, at that time Mr. Carlson was in
another part of the tier washing out his blanket that was
"stinky" from spilt milk.

(R 394, 399, 402, 406, 435). In jail,

"[i]f you were to have a dirty blanket, it would probably take a
week or two to get another one from downstairs.

Later, after the

incident, when the officers came, they got Carlson's blanket "out
of the sink."

(R 399).

Inmate Smith testified that someone forcibly hit him against
the bars of the tier cell door.

(R 290). Although his back was

to the surrounding inmates he claimed that it was Mr. Carlson who
had hit him.

(R 290-1).

Smith's observations also may have been

either hindered or untimely because another person had thrown a
blanket at him, which landed over his head.

(R 289-90, 126).

Inmate Smith's identification was particularly uncertain because
of the close proximity of the other two inmates at the precise
moment of the assault and the blanket obscuring Smith's vision.
(R 287-88, 290, 369, 124-25);
According to jail guard George Tonga, when he eventually
responded to the scene after Smith's injury, he noticed Carlson,
"but he [Carlson] wasn't the closest one to him [Smith].
[Carlson] was off to the right.

He

And the one that was just

walking around swinging a towel this way, last name Martinez, he
was threatening something in Spanish."

(R 3 69).

There is no dispute that inmate Smith was injured.
bled and his face had been cut and bruised.
5

His nose

(R 378). However,

two eyewitness inmates, testified that Richard Carlson was not
responsible and was not involved in the altercation.

John Hender

confirmed that Carlson was washing his blanket at the time.
394, 399, 405). Ted Hall verified Hender's observations.

(R
(R

317, 328). Inmate Todd Dennis testified that "I didn't actually
see who hit him [Smith], but I know it wasn't Rick [Carlson] that
did it.

Rick was on the other side of the tier".

(R 337). The

entire case hinged on how the jury would be persuaded based upon
the witnesses' credibility.

The court itself observed that

'•credibility will be very important in this case."

(R 173).

At trial, the prosecution injected personal comment and
belief into his argument and interrogation of the witnesses and
improperly questioned defense witnesses under Rule 609, Utah R.
Evidence.

(R 455, 464, 403-8, 350). Moreover, the credibility

of inmate Smith was so ". . . very important in this case".
166).

(R

Notwithstanding, the court allowed inmate Smith to sit

with the prosecutor at counsel table (R 173), as if giving the
appearance of being the State's "representative".

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The prosecution may be zealous in its representation, but it
engages in misconduct when it improperly insinuates matters not
in evidence, when it injects personal opinion into its argument,
and questioning, and when it addresses areas which the jury may
not consider.

In a case where witness credibility was the factor

determinative to the jury's verdict, the prosecution's comments
and questioning of witnesses improperly crossed the permissible
bounds of advocacy.
A single instance, standing alone, might arguably be
considered harmless.

However, where witness credibility was

crucial to identification, the jury's fact finding role became
infected by the prosecution's repeated inappropriate questioning
and misconduct with the defense witnesses.

Defendant asserts

that the prosecution's conduct tilted the scales of fairness and
propriety and prejudiced Mr. Carlson's right to a fair trial.
The failure of Defendant's counsel to object at trial to
each and every instance does not lessen the prejudicial impact of
the improper injection of personal opinion and the inappropriate
cross examination.

The prosecution's misconduct was plain error

which this court should remedy, even absent objections by defense
counsel at trial.

However, if the prosecution's errors were not

sufficiently plain and obvious to invoke the "plain error" rule,
then Mr. Carlson was denied the effective assistance of counsel
at trial and his conviction should be reversed.
7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S VERDICT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
PROSECUTORS COMMENTS AND CONDUCT AT TRIAL WERE
IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL
The prosecutions conduct at trial was both improper and
prejudicial and defendants guilty verdict should be reversed and
remanded for a new trial•

In State v. Tillman, the Utah Supreme

Court held that a conviction must be reversed when the verdict is
improperly influenced by prosecutorial misconduct,
A prosecutor's actions and remarks constitute
misconduct that merits reversal if the actions or
remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters
they would not be justified in considering in
determining their verdict and, under the circumstances
of the particular case, the error is substantial and
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood
that in its absence, there would have been a more
favorable result for the defendant.
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987).

Accord State v.

Emmett 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339
(Utah App. 1993).

The verdict should be overturned when

prosecutor's comments or conduct are both improper and
prejudicial.

A.

THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS REGARDING GUILT OF
ACCUSED AND CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES WAS IMPROPER
AND HARMFUL

Whether a prosecutor's statements are improper and
constitute error is whether the remarks call to the jurors'
attention matters which they would not be justified in
8

considering in reaching a verdict.

When improper statements are

deemed harmful, reversal is required.

State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d

781, 785 (Utah 1992).
The harm accompanying improper prosecutorial statements has
long been recognized:
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of
witnesses and expressing his personal opinion
concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers:
such comments can convey the impression that evidence
not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor,
supports the charges against the defendant and can thus
jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on
the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and
the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the
Government's judgment rather than it own view of the
evidence.
State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 1989) (quoting
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)).
In Hopkins, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the jury
should not have considered the following improper argument:
But remember that what I say is not evidence. The fact
that this representative of the State is plainly
impressed by the evidence is no call for you to be
impressed by the evidence. When is the thing proven?
A thing is proven individually. It's only when an
individual, not a group but an individual, accumulates
enough observations and impressions and reasonings and
feelings to satisfy themselves [sic] personally that
that is so. Impressions that build to definite proof
are nontransferable. It is impossible for me to convey
in words in any capacity why the State is so impressed
with the evidence in this case.
Hopkins. 782 P.2d at 479.

9

The same sort of improper argument was presented to the jury
in the present case.

During closing argument, the prosecution

argued:
Was it Mr. Carlson who did it? Mr. Smith said
absolutely, unequivocally, I had to look at Mr.
Carlson. When he testified. You can examine this
matter testified [sic]. You will have to judge whether
or not he is telling you the truth. The State admits
defense witnesses have not been credible. They have
been motivated by reasons of their own not to tell the
truth and the whole truth, as they sworn that they
would. (R 455) (emphasis added).
Later in its argument, the prosecution's personal attack
continued:
[Mr. Carlson's attorney] talked about the ethics of the
defense witnesses. The State submits that the defense
witnesses have no ethics. They have only one concern, and
that is their own self-interest and the interest of their
particular f r i e n d s . ( R 464)(emphasis added).1
These arguments are, in effect, the expressions of personal
opinion and should not have been heard or considered by the jury.
See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b) (2d ed. 1980)
("It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his
or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of
any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant").

1

During closing argument, the prosecution offered the
same type of improper hyperbole to the jury: "When I asked him
questions about his involvement, what was it? He had to think
about this first before he could give an answer. You saw the way
he testified. Was that the testimony of a truthful man? Someone
you could believe? Was he someone who was always hedging? Never
answering any questions directly, but trying to get around them.
The State suggests he was not a believable witness." (R 451)
10
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he well knew it was improper when he asked it and that it had
already achieved its intended purpose.
This court should overturn defendant's guilty verdict in
light of the prosecutor's prejudicial misconduct.
D.

IMPROPER REFERENCE TO WITNESSES' PAST CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS RESULTED IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

The prosecutor's constant reference to defense witness Todd
Dennis' past criminal convictions was improper and prejudicial to
the defendant.

Under Utah Rules of Evidence 404 and 609, past

criminal convictions are only admissible to attack the
credibility of a defendant or witness.
785.

See Emmett, 839 P.2d at

Specifically, Rule 609(a) provides:
(a) For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, (1) evidence that a witness other than the accused
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to
Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs it prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment. Utah R. Evid.
609(a).
A prosecutor's Rule 609(a) inquiry is limited to the nature

of the crime, the date of the conviction and the punishment.

See

United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977) 2 ,
State v. Tucker. 800 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1990) (prior
conviction inquires "should
2

Utah Rule 609 and Federal Rule 609 are identical and Utah
appellate courts have followed the federal interpretations.
See
State v. Bruce 779 P.2d 646, 654 (Utah 1989); State v. Tucker,
800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990).
18

Not only were the prosecutor's comments in this case
improper, but they were also prejudicial.

The prosecutor's

comments may even be presumed prejudicial where the evidence of
guilt is not strong.
In a case with less compelling proof, this Court will
more closely scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion
of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing
interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that
they will be improperly influenced through remarks of
counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be
searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the
evidence. They may be especially susceptible to
influence, and a small degree of influence may be
sufficient to affect the verdict.
State v. Trov 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984).

The evidence of Mr.

Carlson's guilt in this case was weak and supported only by
Inmate Smith's claim that someone looking like Carlson was coming
toward him while his back was turned.

(R 289-90).

Mr. Smith did

not even know who Mr. Carlson was at the time, but picked out his
photograph later.

(R 3 62).

Moreover, there was no physical

evidence to corroborate Smith's claim that it was Mr. Carlson who
attacked him.
There was not an "abundance of evidence of guilt" in this
case as in Hopkins, 782 P.2d at 475.

Rather, the Jury's verdict

was apparently based only on the victim-inmate's testimony of
what he saw after a blanket was thrown by Kidder to partially
block his vision.

This lack of evidence required the jury to

choose between the conflicting testimony of the prisoners.

11

The last thing the jury heard from the prosecution in this
case was deprecating comments regarding the defense witnesses,
all while inmate Smith sat with the prosecutor at counsel table.
Because credibility and character of the defense witnesses were
the heart of the defense, the personally disparaging comments by
the prosecution where particularly harmful.

The entire case

depended upon the jury's "search for guidance" in weighing the
credibility of the defense witnesses verses the victim.
This court should presume that the prosecutor's personal
arguments were prejudicial, as well as inappropriate and that
there was great potential for harm resulting from the
prosecutor's disparaging personal comments of the defense
witnesses.

B.

UNSUPPORTED INNUENDOS REGARDING FACTS NOT IN
EVIDENCE PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO FAIR
TRIAL.

The prosecution violated another well-settled principle by
arguing matters not in evidence or suggesting unsupported
innuendo.

It is error to ask an accused a question that implies

the existence of a prejudicial fact unless the prosecution can
prove the existence of the fact.

"Otherwise, the only limit on

such a line of questioning would be the prosecutor's
imagination."

State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992)

(footnote omitted).

See also. State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339,

12

3 4 2 - 4 4 (U t ah Aj l

( l oii") c\

Il 9 9 3 ) ; 'U.S. v .

f

Silvers te,/,.

3 7 F. 2 d 864,

868

:i s 8 l) .

Criticising such prosecutorial tantins. the cou.
Emmett case observed that
/M

-

ano.

Emmett'£

*~ *

*• * : ne pc:

r

• *

:>-; prosecutor asr.
*

*^ ^ ^

- . I ;i ::: i i

* -;e j~i 2

.-

a

prosecutor's ajlegations, tne question nevertheless implies that
the defense attorney manufactured Emmett' <= testimony
e

:

786 «
The prosecuti >n's attempts
U l l III1 I'l I I l l l S t r

I

Q
[by tnt
know a lot »»^_
on. don't you?
A L^i JH Hi
assumption?

n this case were similarly
il

; Now, Mr. Hender. you really
L.U tnis case than you are letting

i-'ti':

from where ao yuu get that

Q Well, i on ai: e the one that keeps communicating from
Mr. Carlson to Mr. Smith; Isn't that true?
A

What do you mean?

[Mr. Carlson's attorney ]i your Honor
I tfil] have to
object to this line of questioning. There is no
evidence that this occurred .
THE COURT:
forward.

The objection is overruled.

You may go

Q
[by the prosecution:] Now it is true, isn't it. Mr.
Hender. you are the person who in the past has taken
messages from Mr. Carlson over the to Mr. Smith?
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[Mr. Carlson's attorney]: Your Honor, I am going to
have to object again. I believe there is a possible
Fifth Amendment claim here of witness tampering and I
will have to object on those grounds.
THE COURT:

The objection is overruled.

[Mr. Carlson:]

Would you repeat the question.

Q [by the prosecution:] Isn't it true that you are
the one who has been carrying messages from Mr. Carlson
to Mr. Smith, talking about this case?
A The only way that would be possible for anyone [is]
if they were a trustee. I am not a trustee. I don't
have any means to carry any messages to anyone. . .
Q You haven't sent any messages to Mr. Smith about
this case?
A Heck no. He has got nothing to do with me. I don't
even care about this guy. He has not got nothing to do
with me and I don't know why he puts a finger on Rick
when Rick wasn't even in the room when anything
happened to him. He is just looking for someone to
blame for this.
(R 403-05) (emphasis added).
The Emmett court has condemned such tactics:
To allow this sort of examination would be to allow the
imaginative and overzealous prosecutor to concoct a
damaging line of examination which could leave with the
jury the impression that defendant was anything the
question, by innuendo, seemed to suggest. If the
questions were persistent enough and cleverly enough
framed, no amount of denial on the part of the
defendant would be able to erase the impression in the
mind of the jury that the prosecutor actually had such
facts on hand and that probably there was some truth to
the insinuations. 839 P.2d at 787 fn.18 (citations
omitted).
A continuous badgering of Mr. Hender regarding facts not in
evidence is just the sort of examination that the Emmett Court
decried.

The impact on the jury of these baseless innuendos was
14
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Q And isn't it true, Mr. Hender, that you actually saw
Mr. Smith assaulted?
A

Have I not already answered that question?

Q And isn't it true, Mr. Hender, that you saw Mr.
Carlson run up and hit Mr. Smith in the back of the
head and push his head into those bars; isn't that
true?
A That is not, not even. I told you, Mr. Carlson was
on the other side of the cell.
Q And isn't it true, Mr. Hender, you have been
attempting to get Mr. Smith not to go forward with
these charges in this case?
A

I don't even know this guy.

(R 403, 407, 408) (emphasis added).
This continued unsubstantiated questioning, with its
insinuations as to matters not in evidence, was an improper
attempt "to induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment
rather than its own view of the evidence."
P.2d 475, 480 (Utah 1989).

State v. Hopkins, 782

Additionally, the prosecution was

able to imbue validity through sheer repetition, as a means to
counter denials by a witness.

See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 787, n.18

("if the questions were persistent enough and cleverly enough
framed, no amount of denial on the part of the defendant would be
able to erase the impression in the mind of the jury that the
prosecutor actually had such facts on hand and that probably
there was some truth to the insinuations").
This Court should reverse the defendant's conviction because
of the prosecutor's improper and prejudicial innuendos and
16

inferences regard:

* ~\ r

sported "

reasonably doubt Fi *' ^ha1" jr»*' '

,Knr

rhr evidence.

a^-i-or* ooar*«-,

It is

~. persistent

baagex
impressicr- *";at th- prosecutor actually had undisclosed evidence
on hand to prove I s infer^nc

^ubimt that absent the

i
likelihood that, a

esult /uore livorabic '

* ne delenaant could

have, been achieved,
C

THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ASKED FOR WITNESS
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The inquiry was prejudicially damaging

though defense counsel's objection was sustained.

the prosecutor's failure to defend his own question sugge
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it

he well knew it was improper when he asked it and that it had
already achieved its intended purpose.
This court should overturn defendant's guilty verdict in
light of the prosecutor's prejudicial misconduct.
D.

IMPROPER REFERENCE TO WITNESSES' PAST CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS RESULTED IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

The prosecutor's constant reference to defense witness Todd
Dennis' past criminal convictions was improper and prejudicial to
the defendant.

Under Utah Rules of Evidence 404 and 609, past

criminal convictions are only admissible for the limited purpose
of attacking the credibility of a defendant or witness.
Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785.

See

Specifically, Rule 609(a) provides:

For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime . . . (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
However, in order to insure that information regarding prior
convictions is used only for impeachment purposes, a prosecutor's
Rule 609(a) inquiry is limited to the nature of the crime, the
date of the conviction and the punishment.

See United States v.

Wolf. 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977) 2 , State v. Tucker, 800
P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1990) (prior conviction inquires "should

2

Utah Rule 609 and Federal Rule 609 are identical and
Utah appellate courts have followed the federal interpretations.
See State v. Bruce 779 P.2d 646, 654 (Utah 1989); State v.
Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990).
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you and that is not to have a snitch jacket; isn't that
true?
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A

No, sir.

(R 350) (emphasis added).
The Prosecution's repeated editorializing, "dishonest, isn't
it?", was both a misstatement of the law and beyond the
permissible scope of cross examination.

See State v. Brown. 771

P.2d 1093, 1095 (Utah App. 1989) (theft is not necessarily a
crime involving dishonesty); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656
(Utah 1989)(attempted robbery is not necessarily a crime of
dishonesty).

In Tucker, this court cautioned that a prosecutor

may not "parade the details of the prior crime in front of the
jury."

Tucker, 800 P.2d at 822.

The prosecutor's questioning

prejudicially exceeded inquiry allowed by Rule 609 and supporting
case law.
The trial court also erred by allowing the evidence of Mr.
Dennis' prior convictions for theft and burglary which are not
necessarily crimes of dishonesty or false statement.

There was

no evidence or proffer that these crimes were committed by
dishonest means.
was error.

Admission of these convictions for impeachment

This Court should reverse the conviction of defendant

because the prosecutor tainted the testimony of defense witnesses
through improper questioning about prior convictions.
The foregoing discussion has illustrated several instances
of prosecutorial misconduct that were not only improper, but also
prejudicial to the defense and a fair trial.

The various

instances of prosecutorial misconduct, constitute "remarks
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POINT II
THE PROSECUTION'S MISCONDUCT WAS PLAIN ERROR AND THE ERROR
WAS NOT WAIVED BY COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT.
Even though Mr. Carlson7s counsel failed to timely object
to the prosecution's improper comments and questions, the right
to object was not waived because the error was plain and obvious.
Failure to object to improper remarks will constitute a
waiver of the claim, unless the remarks constitute
plain error. Plain error is error that is both harmful
and obvious. This court reviews allegations of plain
error despite the lack of a timely objection, provided,
of course, that the trial court was not led into error.
We do so in order to avoid manifest injustice and
because, if the error is obvious, the trial court has
the opportunity to address the error regardless of the
fact that it was never brought to the court's
attention.
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992) (Emphasis added).
In this case, not every instance of misconduct argued in
Point I was preserved by timely objection.

Notwithstanding, each

instance of the prosecutions repeated misconduct presents a
cumulative effect of both error and prejudice which should have
been plain and obvious to both the trial court and counsel.
Moreover, the prosecution's comments violated several
ethical rules.

ABA Model Rule 3.4(e) both requires that a lawyer

must not state a personal opinion about the credibility of a
witness or the guilt or innocence of an accused, and prohibits a
lawyer from referring to material that will not be supported by
admissible evidence.
(2d ed. 1980) states:

ABA Standards of Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b)
"It is unprofessional conduct for the
22
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POINT III
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT DENIED DEFENDANT
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
In the event this Court concludes that the argued errors at
trial were not "plain error," then Mr. Carlson was denied the
effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to
object to the varied and numerous improper and prejudicial
comments during the trial.

In State v. Frame, the Utah Supreme

Court first established the Strickland criteria to show
ineffective assistance of counsel.

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401

(Utah 1986); accord State v. Villarreal 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995).
1.

Did counsel's representation fall below an objective

standard of reasonableness of professionally competent
assistance? and;
2.

But for the ineffective assistance, there is a

reasonable probability of a different outcome.
(723 P.2d at 405). See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
By failing to object to the prosecutor/s badgering of
witnesses and inappropriate argument, defense counsel's fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,
and prejudiced the defendant's fair trial.
As discussed herein, the prosecutor's statements were
improper and harmful.

While defense counsel did object to a few

of the prejudicial questions, counsel failed to object to other
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The errors should

have been obvious and plain to trial counsel who should have
raised the appropriate objections.
The impact of counsel's failure to object, just as the
plainness of the errors, is not just academic.

The errors would

change any reasonable person's entire outlook on the eyewitness
testimony.

This case pits the State's single witness against the

defense eyewitnesses.

Although inmate Smith claimed that Mr.

Carlson was responsible, he admitted that a blanket had been
placed over his head at the time of the assault.
looked back, looked back to my left.
came over me.

"I [Smith]

That is when the blanket

All I know is I went face first toward the bars."

(R 290).
The testimony of every other witness at the scene confirmed
that Mr. Carlson was not present in the milieu but was across the
cell washing out his blanket.

(R 317, 328, 394, 339, 405). The

testimony was not extreme or inherently incredible.
limited their testimony to what they saw.

They simply

Todd Dennis candidly

admitted, "I didn't actually see who hit him, but I know it
wasn't Rick [Mr. Carlson] that did it.
side of the tier."

Rick was on the other

(R 337).

Ted Hall also only observed Mr. Carlson "standing at the big
wash sink washing his blanket at the time."
Hall heard threats from
Carlson.

(R 317, 328). Mr.

ff

[t]he Mexicans", (R 324), not from Mr.

The Prosecution's jailor George Tonga suggested such a

Mexican link through "Martinez", who had made threats in Spanish
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counsel had not remained silent and had brought objections to the
trial court's attention.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse
his conviction and to remand the case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this 14th day of March, 1996.

ClarQc^. Nielsen
HENRIOD & NIELSEN

Attorney for Appellant
Richard Lynn Carlson
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UtAH 1 ;,' f <7 £« / j . .

Q

THE STATE OF UTAH.
JUDGMENT^ SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)-

Plaintiff.
J

Case NO

CARLSON, RICHARD LYNN

f
\

Count No.
Honorable _

Utah S t a t e

(
1

Clerk
Reporter

vs.

Prison

J

Bailiff
Date

Defendant.

,.„.

941901400
Tyrone E. M e d l e y
S. H e n s l e y
D. T r i p p
S. W i l l i a m s
J a n u a r y 9 , 1995

O The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by § 3 jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of
a g ^ n U Hy a p r T c n r i o - r
, a felony
of the _ 3 r d e g r e e , D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by K. C l a r k L and the State being represented by R. Y b a r r a is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
Q
a
Q
a
O
D
•

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than fiye years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $to.

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
S such sentence is to run consecutively with
sentences
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, Q Court, Count(s) _

now serving
are hereby dismissed.

D

O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
t h
a Defendant is remanded into the custody of ® j « ^ ^ 5 i ^ ^ ^ ^ $ i 5 S ^ t 3 for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitmer
a Commitment shall issue
f orthwi f h
DATED this 9 t h
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney
(White—Court)

(Gr««n—Judg«)

Page — i _ of
(Y©«ow-J«iUPnson/APiP)

(Pink—0«f«ns«)

(GokJ«nrod— Slat*)

*o-o-iuz.o.

Assault by prisoner.

Any prisoner who commits assault- ;„<- J- .
of a felony of the third d ^ r e e '
^ ^ t 0

C3USe b o d

^ ^ u i y , is guilty

is?irsr3 2 c - § 19 3 5 3 3,76 - 5 - i02 - 5 ' enactcdb ^Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime,
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted
of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if
a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However,
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an
appeal is admissible.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and changes Utah
law by granting the court discretion in convictions not involving dishonesty or false statettient to refuse to admit the evidence if it would
ta prejudicial to the defendant. Current Utah
law mandates the admission of such evidence,
State v. Bennett, 30 Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d
1029 (1973); State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324
i t a n 1976); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353
^tah 1980).
There is presently no provision in Utah law
iimilar to Subsection (d).

The pendency of an appeal does not render a
conviction inadmissible. This is in accord with
Utah case law. State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6,
206 P. 717 (1922).
This rule is identical to Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The 1990 amendments
to the federal rule made two changes in the
rule. The comment to the federal rule accurately reflects the Committee's view of the purpose of the amendments,
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, rewrote Subdivision (a).

